Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ACIS 2005 Proceedings

Australasian (ACIS)

December 2005

The Asian Tsunami: An urgent case for improved
government information systems and management
Nigel Martin
Australian National University

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2005
Recommended Citation
Martin, Nigel, "The Asian Tsunami: An urgent case for improved government information systems and management" (2005). ACIS
2005 Proceedings. 93.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2005/93

This material is brought to you by the Australasian (ACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ACIS 2005
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

16th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
29 Nov – 2 Dec 2005, Sydney

Asian Tsunami & Govt IS Management
Nigel Martin

The Asian Tsunami: An urgent case for improved government information systems and
management
Nigel Martin
School of Business and Information Management
Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Australian National University
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Email: nigel.martin@defence.gov.au

Abstract
This discussion paper provides a timely consideration of how regional governments in Asia and other national
governments around the world collect, manage, and share information in what is becoming an increasingly
global community. The paper addresses the socio-technical perspective of government information systems and
management, and draws on several public reports, media articles, and expert opinions published in the
aftermath of the Asian tsunami of 26 December 2004. On the basis of the published material, the paper observes
how critical early warning information was handled by government authorities in the hours before the tsunami
wave strike, discusses the availability of technological solutions that can provide earthquake and tsunami
warning information, and poses that government bureaucracies and human relations form the weakest link in the
information chain. The type of early warning information system that might be created to avoid another loss of
life, suggested improvements to inter-government information sharing and communications, and the emerging
requirement for earthquake and tsunami information dissemination and education are also discussed. The paper
concludes with a research agenda for government warning information systems and management.
Keywords
Tsunami, earthquake, government, information, systems, management.

INTRODUCTION
On 26 December 2004, at approximately 00:58:53 UTC (Universal Coordinated Time), a massive earthquake
measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale struck off the western coast of northern Sumatra in Indonesia. The epicentre
of the earthquake was 18.6 miles under the Indian Ocean at the geographic coordinate 3.32 degrees North and
95.85 degrees East. This seismic event represented the fourth largest earthquake since 1900 and fired giant 50
foot high tsunamis waves (a Japanese term for ‘harbour wave’, used by fishermen who, having not experienced
any unusually large waves at sea, returned home to find a devastated harbour shoreline) into the shorelines of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. Some effects were felt as far away as Somalia and Kenya on the east
coast of Africa (Wikipedia 2005).
In gaining some perspective on this seismic event, the earthquake that triggered the tsunami released 2 x10¹⁸
joules of energy and shifted some island landmasses by up to 36 metres. Several aftershocks measuring between
5 and 7.3 on the Richter scale only served to remind and reinforce the enormity of this catastrophic event. Over
159,000 people perished in the wake of the tsunamis, with over 43,000 still unaccounted for, and over 1.5
million people displaced from their homes (Wikipedia 2005). The scale of this disaster has seen a number of
government and humanitarian aid organisations launch into action to assist the injured and displaced. However,
once the dust settles on these tragic events, some government analysts will ask the question: Could we have
done more to prevent the loss of life?
There is little, if anything, that the regional governments could have done to prevent the loss of property and
homes. The nature of the seismic event and its devastating after effects were clearly not within the contemplation
of citizens, commercial operators and tourists whom these countries depend on as part of their economy.
However, in the aftermath of the tragedy several parties (including the international press) have speculated that
critical information system and management failures may have cost lives. Lives that might otherwise have been
saved had it not been for socio-technical breakdowns (ie, social and technical system failures) in the government
information chain. This paper will examine some of the more critical failures that were publicly reported and
appear to have diminished the available early warning times for those most effected.
The balance of the paper is set out as follows:
•

A short review of information system and management failure literature.
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•

The theoretical basis selected for the study.

•

A brief outline of the information collection process for this paper, including the limitations of the
research approach.

•

A review of some the more glaring examples of government information system and management
failures.

•

A discussion on the available warning information systems and technologies.

•

An outline of some of the valuable lessons learned and reactions to the tsunami.

•

A possible future research agenda in the area of government warning information systems and
management.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT FAILURE
The failure of government information systems and management procedures and processes has a history that can
be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s when Bostrom and Heinen (1977a and 1977b) conducted research into
management information systems problems, failures and causes using a socio-technical frame. The research
found that information systems developers and designers held a range of preconceptions on how organisational
users typically behave, and that systems users should be closely monitored and managed. Bostrom and Heinen
(1977a and 1977b) also found that these preconceptions were often wrong and resulted in difficulties when
developing and implementing new organisational systems. The research showed that political infighting and
conflicts in party interests also impacted new systems implementation, and that users must take responsibility for
systems implementation success.
In another relevant study, Schmitt and Kozar (1978) developed a case study that outlined management’s role in
the failure of an information system development project within a state government-planning agency. The
research highlighted critical management failures in the areas of insufficient systems knowledge, unwarranted
trust, poor contracting processes, and an inescapable project failure cycle. Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987) also
published a substantial compendium of information system and management failure research. The case research
used witness accounts of system failures published in government reports, computer and information system
journals, and newspaper press articles as the archival sources of evidence.
In a promising contemporary review of information systems failures, Rocheleau (1997) studied a number of US
government agencies and developed a summary table of problems and limitations that afflict government
information systems and management practices. In particular, the review identified system integration
limitations, obstacles to data sharing, poor management, and low data quality as important problems. Rocheleau
(1997) quoted the following examples:
•

The US Environmental Protection Agency experienced system integration difficulties as the
organisation attempted to integrate the separate systems within each of its field offices. The data
integration problems inhibited the agency’s understanding of national pollution types and sources,
and its capacity to deal with pollution problems (US General Accounting Office 1992).

•

Small emergency agencies such as police and fire departments have difficulties sharing and
exchanging information sets. Organisations may be reluctant to share information fearing a loss of
political power or control, misuse of the data or information, or criticism in the media or public
domain (US General Accounting Office 1994). As a consequence, many individuals jealously guard
and control their most important information.

•

High quality information systems and technologies are not a substitute for poor management. Using
a high quality information system cannot rectify poor system and/or organisational goals, deficient
business and management processes, and weak leadership and decision-making (Schmitt and Kozar
1978). Other management factors that can impact system failure profiles include insufficient staff or
staff skills and ineffective organisational structures (US General Accounting Office 1995a).

•

Missing or inadequate data impacts the capacity to make accurate and fast management decisions.
Incomplete data sets do not support informed judgments on important public issues such as
community health or civil aviation safety (US General Accounting Office 1994, 1995b).

Other studies have also highlighted the criticality of data timeliness, completeness, and relevance for decisionmaking and solving business problems (Fisher and Kingma 2001). Some of the issues identified in the prior
research, such as information timeliness, completeness and relevance, will be discussed in the balance of the
paper.
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THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE STUDY
The Bostrom and Heinen studies (1977a and 1977b) provided a useful socio-technical systems lens for the
conduct of the study. Bostrom and Heinen (1977a and 1977b) characterised the organisation as a larger ‘work
system’ that could be bifurcated into a technical system and a social system. The work system was
conceptualised as a complex interdependent and complementary set of information systems, with the work
outputs resulting from the various systemic interactions. From the technical perspective, the study examined the
technical processes, tasks, and technologies required to produce and deliver the government warning
information sets (ie, telecommunications, satellite communication platforms, radio services, geographic
information systems). The social systems analysis investigated and observed the social relationships among
people, including the attributes of people such as educational background, attitudes, skills, values and personal
qualities.

INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCESS AND LIMITATIONS
The information collected for this paper used the archival research approach adopted by Lyytinen and
Hirschheim (1987). The information was extracted from published public reports, articles from world media
sources, and expert opinions and public commentaries collected over a two month period from 27 December
2004 to 27 February 2005. Particular emphasis was placed on high profile information system and management
failures reported through several independent sources or entities. The paper also draws heavily on technical
information systems papers and data sets produced by geological and environmental government agencies and
academic institutions, and the public opinions and commentaries from world experts and researchers in the
fields of earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis. This data collection process was undertaken to canvass and
develop balanced views of the information systems and management failures and the potential solutions for
providing early warning information for impending natural disasters.
This research approach has similar limitations to the work of Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987). The archival data
collected relies on negative accounts of the information systems and management failures and generally does not
provide any positive or counterbalancing views. A number of the expert opinions reported in the international
press, and used in the research are of a limited and non-analytical nature. Also, in this paper information systems
and management failure has been defined as the breakdown of systems and management procedures that
ultimately led to the loss of life. In other studies, information systems failure has been characterised by the
limitations in corporate understanding (US General Accounting Office 1992), inhibited corporate system
integration (US General Accounting Office 1994), or a loss of management control (US General Accounting
Office 1995a). These differences in the definition of failure do not readily support comparisons with the prior
information systems and management research studies.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT FAILURES
The following examples, drawn from public reports, media articles and expert opinions, discuss some of the more
visible and unusual government information system and management failures that occurred prior to the tsunami
wave strike. While the early warning information would have done little to alleviate the physical and property
devastation from the tsunami, the information may have allowed people to escape to higher ground or take other
emergency actions.
India’s tangled and complacent bureaucracy
In possibly the worse case of government information system and management failure, the Indian government
wasted valuable time in issuing the first tsunami alert (Channel News Asia International 2004; Chadda 2005). In
a chronology of events that reflects the poor state of information management within that country, the Indian Air
Force was advised of the earthquake at 7.30am (0200 GMT). Before the communications link failed, a frantic
message that: the island was sinking and there is water all over was received. However, it was some 45 minutes
later at 8.15am that the Chief of the Air Force requested an administrative assistant to alert the defence ministry.
Independently, at 8.54am the Indian Meteorological Department sent a warning fax message to the former
science minister, not the current minister who was installed in May 2004 due to national elections and a change
in the ruling government. Unaware of this mistake, the department sent another fax to the Home Ministry’s
disaster control room at 9.41am. Nearly an hour later at 10.30 am (0500 GMT), the disaster control room advised
the cabinet secretariat. India’s crisis management group met at 1.00pm (0730 GMT) that afternoon (five and a
half hours after the initial alert).
To make matters worse, the head of the science and technology department stated publicly that the first advice his
department received on the earthquake-tsunami was what they saw on the television! Indian seismologists had
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monitored the seismic event, but in their complacency had ignored the data as it was outside India’s geographic
borders. Critical and relevant early warning information was ignored and thousands were now dead or missing.
Messages to Indonesia go unanswered
In Indonesia, the situation appeared little better than the experiences of India. Some twenty minutes after the
earthquake hit, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre, operated by the US National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in Honolulu issued e-mail messages to Indonesian officials warning them
of the likelihood of a tsunami and impending disaster. US officials were unable to confirm what had happened to
those warning messages (Kayal and Wald 2004). Additionally, because the US monitoring centres concentrate on
the Pacific Ocean, NOAA staff had no counterpart addresses or contacts in the effected countries bordering the
Indian Ocean. The well-intentioned collaboration and information sharing between national geological survey
organisations had not been sufficiently progressed to assist effected countries. Despite the best efforts of the US
scientists, inter-government information transfer and sharing had failed.
Staffing absences, slow information processing, and limited coverage
The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) recorded the earthquake on 78 of its seismic monitoring stations within
minutes of the event. Seventy-one stations were using the seismic, six the hydro-acoustic, and one the
infrasound technologies for the earthquake monitoring task (CTBTO 2005). Following standard operating
practices during the Christmas and New Year holiday period, the first automatic event list containing the
Sumatra earthquake data was released by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna to effected treaty
signatories (ie, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Oman) about two hours after the
event, that is at about 03:00 UTC on 26 December 2004 (The Times Newspaper 2005). The second and third
automatic event lists followed at 6 hours and 12 hours after the event. In this case, not only was the transmission
of the warning information slow due to personnel absences, but some of the worst effected countries were not
informed (ie, were not signatories to the treaty or did not have data centres established). Again information
transfers and sharing had failed.
Inter-government Protocols – with lives in the balance
In another unusual chain of events, Geoscience Australia’s earthquake monitoring centre reacted quickly to the
incoming data and issued warning messages to Australia’s regional embassies within thirty-three minutes of the
initial earthquake. However, no warning information or earthquake data was passed to foreign governments in
accordance with proper inter-government and diplomatic protocols being observed. Information transfer between
the impacted countries had failed. With thousands of lives in the balance, the current government to government
protocols, built upon outdated foreign country engagement guidelines and outmoded cold war philosophies, may
require substantial simplification and improved flexibility (The Times Newspaper 2005).

WARNING INFORMATION SYSTEMS, TECHNOLOGIES AND EDUCATION
Reflecting on the reported examples of critical information system and management failures, it becomes evident
that seismic and earthquake warning information was handled poorly at the intra and inter governmental levels.
Several information transfer choke points or bottlenecks have worked to reduce the warning information velocity,
and appear to have lead to the preventable loss of life. However, the technology and educational processes
required to save lives exists today. The following sections discuss some of the available warning information
systems and education processes, and pose that human relations, in particular government bureaucracies, are the
weakest link in the information chain. It could be argued that the systemic weakness resides with government
bureaucracies and the human side of this tragic event.
Tsunami detection information systems and technologies
The US NOAA commenced using a deep-water sensor array to measure water pressure and changes in water
depth as a tsunami wave passes overhead in 2003 (NOAA 2003). The Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of
Tsunamis (DART) sensors deployed to the Pacific Ocean basin are more accurate than the seismograph and tidal
gauge sensor systems, and generally lead to fewer tsunami false alarms. Importantly, DART sensors transfer the
critical tsunami warning information (ie, water pressure and depth changes) to surface buoys, which in turn relay
the information to the monitoring centres via geostationary satellite communication systems (see Figure 1).
Clearly, noting that no tsunami monitoring system is deployed in the Indian Ocean, the modern technologies,
such as DART sensors, that are capable of detecting tsunami waves and distributing this vital government
warning information presently exist and are protecting the Pacific Ocean basin.
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The importance of the DART sensor arrays and associated information technologies cannot be underestimated
given the costs of issuing incorrect warning information. In one notable case of a tsunami false alarm, the
evacuation of a section of Hawaii in 1986 cost the United States government approximately $30 million
(Vergano 2004). Additionally, from the social perspective, false alarms have proven to be counter-productive,
including breeding psychological complacency to warning signs, and lulling the community into a false sense of
security.
Satellite imagery and communication systems
Satellite based imaging systems deployed by the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing at the
National University of Singapore (CRISP-NUS) were able to identify unusual wave patterns off the coast of
Thailand on 26 December 2004 (see Figure 2) (CRISP-NUS 2005). Using the satellite data, NUS scientists
noticed a series of unusually fast moving water patterns just off the Thai coastline. In the following hours and
days, the reasons for those unusual wave patterns became clear. A further series of high-resolution satellite
images (including processed geographical information systems data) shows the physical devastation of Katchall
Island in India’s Nicobar group (see Figure 3) (CRISP-NUS 2005).
Despite the availability of these advanced technological tools, warning information was not successfully
managed and transmitted to the relevant government authorities. One could speculate that even if information had
reached the appropriate people, the question of available and reliable communications to the effected population
remains unanswered. David Ovadia, Head of British Geological Survey International outlined the problem: It’s
one thing knowing a tsunami is coming and another to warn the population in time. The real problem is what to
do after the red light, which is an infrastructure problem (Knight 2005). The government officials would have
required the appropriate warning information infrastructure to alert the local population of the impending
disaster. This type of communications and broadcast information system infrastructure does not exist in the
effected countries, and shows a distinct weakness in government information systems and management
processes.

Figure 1: Schematic of the DART oceanographic information system (NOAA 2003)
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Education – disseminating earthquake and tsunami information
The requirement for educating people and disseminating information on the dangers of earthquakes and
tsunamis was further reinforced in the light of the government information management failures. A good
example is the actions of hundreds of Sri Lankan children who were swept away while combing the receding
shoreline for fish (ie, the water line recedes appreciably just prior to a tsunami strike following an earthquake).
Earthquake and tsunami education might have alerted the children and their parents to the impending danger
posed by the incoming walls of water (Wikipedia 2005). In an example of relevant education and information
saving lives, one British family fled northern Phuket in Thailand after their 10-year-old daughter remembered a
geography lesson that explained how the beach line recedes prior to a tsunami wave strike. In this case, people’s
understanding of geological events and the physical warning information helped to save lives that would
otherwise have been lost (Wikipedia 2005).

Figure 2: Unusual Wave Patterns on the coast of Thailand on 26 December 2004 (CRISP-NUS with SPOT-4
Satellite images, Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales 2004)

Figure 3: Katchall Island on 10 July 2004 and 28 December 2004 (CRISP-NUS with SPOT-5 Satellite images,
Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales 2004)
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Summary
The information and communication technology systems that can detect and warn people of an impending
tsunami currently exist and are deployed in other ocean basins around the globe. It can be argued that humans,
including the intrinsic understanding of earthquakes and tsunami events, form the weakest link in the tsunami
warning information system. Whether it is the tangled government bureaucracies of countries like India or
Indonesia, or the lack of sanctioned government information system infrastructure for disaster warnings and
widespread communications, information sharing and dissemination will continue to be a problem in the
immediate term. Any future government information systems that will be developed for the issuing of tsunami
warnings should carefully consider the human and technological aspects of the problem. Teng-Fong Wong, a
geophysicist from the State University of New York in Stony Brook, put the two parts of the problem into
perspective: It’s a people problem not a technology problem. Governments just have to co-operate (Vergano
2004).

VALUABLE LESSONS AND REACTIONS TO THE TSUNAMI
The following sections provide a summary of the valuable lessons learned and some of the international
community’s reactions to the Boxing Day tsunami and the issues surrounding this catastrophic event.
Technical systems implementation
The regional governments in the tsunami impact zone have now taken steps to establish a proper early warning
information system similar to that deployed in the Pacific Ocean. Phil McFadden, the Chief Scientist at
Geoscience Australia, has been commissioned by the Australian government to design an early warning system
for the Indian Ocean. Early designs suggest the system could consist of 30 seismographs to detect earthquakes,
10 tidal gauges, and six DART buoys at a total estimated cost of A$20 million (Knight 2005). Additionally, the
United States government has announced plans for an improved tsunami detection and warning system. The
expanded system will form part of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) and will see 32
new DART buoys deployed at a total cost of $37.5 million during 2005-2006 (NOAA 2005). If implemented
properly, this approach should address the technical side of the government information system problem.
Information sharing issues
The human side of the tsunami warning problem is something that may prove far more challenging to solve. For
example, government to government information sharing protocols must be established in order to maintain
warning information velocity. One of the biggest lessons learned from this natural disaster is that international
government agencies have not worked hard enough to establish clear high velocity communication links. This
inter-government communication work must be expedited in the immediate term. Charles McCreery, Director of
the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre, gave his account of the information transfer difficulties and the urgent
need for future work: We wanted to try and do something, but without a plan in place then, it was not an
effective way to issue a warning, or to have it acted upon. One of the things that was running through my mind
is just that our international group has in many past meetings had discussions about what can be done for other
ocean basins (to issue warnings of impending tsunamis). And I guess I was wishing in retrospect that more
progress had been made in that area (Kayal and Wald 2004).
Disaster management and evacuation planning information
Tightly coupled to the need for improved government information sharing is the requirement for disaster
management and evacuation plans. The challenge in protecting people from earthquake and tsunami disasters is
“getting the word out” and “getting people to abandon their homes and cities at a moment’s notice” (Coren
2005). Jeff LaDouce of the US NOAA emphasised that, given the speed of a tsunami, warnings are of little use
without firm population evacuation plans: Even if you give the tourists resorts in Thailand a half-hour’s notice,
it’s no easy matter to evacuate swaths of coastland. You have to plan and train people. And then do it all over
again (Vergano 2004). Harold Mofjeld, a senior scientist within the NOAA tsunami research program, also
highlighted the importance of timely tsunami warnings when the waves travel at over 750 kilometres per hour
over deep water: The basic criteria is to get a warning out within 10 and 20 minutes (Coren 2005).
In a statement to government leaders, the Director of the US Geological Survey, Dr Charles Groat advised the
US Senate Committee on Science, Commerce and Transportation that providing adequate warnings to people in
areas like Hawaii was very difficult, let alone in less developed countries like those effected by the tsunami: The
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run-for-your-life business has to be communicated very quickly and very effectively and that’s a challenge even
in our country (Cable Network News 2005). As a priority, national governments need to take an active role in
establishing disaster plans for coastal and tourist resort areas. Emergency and warning infrastructure, such as
robust and disaster-proof communications centres, evacuation sirens, sign-posted vehicle escape routes, and
visible high ground shelters should form part of these future protective arrangements.
Earthquake and tsunami education
Public and community education on the dangers of seismic events also needs to be pursued with some urgency.
For too long, complacency has seen Asiatic earthquake tremors go unnoticed with local people, foreign visitors,
and tourists generally uninformed of the potential dangers and unconcerned for their personal safety. The world
renowned US seismic expert and Robert P. Sharp Professor of Geology at the California Institute of Technology,
Dr Kerry Sieh toured the Sumatra area some three weeks before the eruption distributing educational posters and
warning information to locals that outlined the potential devastation that earthquakes and tsunamis can cause. Dr
Sieh also lectured several government officials on the dangers posed by earthquakes all to no avail (Kayal and
Wald 2004). In this case, public education, information on earthquakes and tsunamis, and heeding expert opinion
might have played a positive role in saving some of the lives that were lost.
Information – the universal resource
In a stark reminder that Mother Nature does not discriminate on the basis of geographic or international
boundaries, disaster-warning information should be looked upon as an international asset with no pure sovereign
value. As this tragedy has shown, Indian scientists learned an important lesson that seismic events can have far
reaching effects well outside the event’s national boundaries (Channel News Asia International 2004; Chadda
2005). This form of seismic data and information is typically collected and shared by government agencies on a
co-operative international basis, and accordingly should be classified as information belonging to the broader
global community. This is an important issue for all governments around the world not just those directly
impacted by the Asian tsunami.

GOVERNMENT WARNING INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper provides a basis for future research directions in the area of government warning information systems
and management. A potential research agenda that might be developed and progressed in the future is outlined
in the following points:
•

Case research techniques might be used to study the various governmental actions and reactions to
the earthquake and tsunami. A comparison between pre-tsunami and post-tsunami warning
information systems and management procedures and processes (including infrastructure
developments) could be conducted in one or more of the effected countries.

•

Comparative research studies might be conducted in countries and/or areas that have instituted
earthquake and tsunami warning information systems (eg, Hawaii) and those that have not (eg,
Indonesia). The research program might identify exemplar approaches to warning information
systems development and implementation, business continuity planning, and produce best practice
guidance for countries that are seeking to develop and implement similar systems. A further spin-off
area of research would be the applicability of these types of warning information systems and
technologies to other natural disasters, such as uncontrolled fires, flash floods, hurricanes, or
cyclones.

•

Research on the scope and types of earthquake and tsunami warning information dissemination and
education programs might be conducted in the effected countries. This could include attitudinal
surveys towards physical seismic warnings (such as low level tremors) in pre and post education
program delivery environments, or a consolidated review and analysis of warning information
dissemination and education program delivery modes, channels and materials.

•

A policy research program might also be initiated to examine the future changes in government
information sharing arrangements between countries that have advanced warning information
systems and management procedures (such as the United States) and less advanced countries (such
as Indonesia or Thailand) that are susceptible to earthquakes and tsunamis. The research might
investigate changes in government information sharing policy and procedures at the broader wholeof-government (eg, United States and Indonesian governments) or specific inter-agency (eg, The
National Coordination Agency for Surveys and Mapping of Indonesia and United States Geological
Survey or NOAA) levels.
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CLOSING COMMENTS
The problems and issues highlighted in this paper shows that information systems and management practices are
critical for saving lives in times of natural disasters. In the wake of Asian tsunami tragedy, governments should
carefully review their critical information systems and information management practices. The systematic failures
outlined in this paper also demonstrate the importance of information and data sets to the global community, not
just the sovereign nations who recorded the data or created the information. This paper presents that governments
around the world must take positive actions to address global warning information system and management
shortcomings. Those who perished on 26 December 2004 should not have died in vain. Dr Sieh made this point
most poignantly in his article for Time Magazine: One test of whether humanity acts differently in the next
millennium is this: Can we marshal the visionary persistence needed to take charge of our future? Or will we
carry on as we did throughout most of the past—simply reacting to tragedies as they happen? If the answer is the
second, then there will continue to be more tragedies like that of last week (Sieh 2005).
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